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Abstract
This paper applies the theory of equilibrium in mixed strategies in an inspection game
model to describe the strategic interaction in the stolen base play in baseball. A parsi-
monious simultaneous-move game model oers predictions about how the observable
conduct of the teams on oense and defense responds as the characteristics of the
players involved change. The theory organizes observations from play-by-play data
from Major League Baseball, where highly-motivated, experienced professionals
interact in an environment where private information is not signicant.
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1 Introduction
The suggestion of using formal techniques to study questions of strategy in sport dates
back in print at least as far as Mottley [4]. This suggestion was fullled, in the case of
the game of baseball, in part by the work of Lindsey [3] and Bellman [1], who used
ideas from basic decision theory and dynamic programming, respectively, to investigate
some questions of optimal strategy.
. This document has been written using the GNU TEXMACS text editor (see www. texmacs. org).
1Some more recent papers have departed from this normative approach towards a
descriptive view. In particular, the zero-sum nature of many sporting contests makes it
likely that active randomization is part of optimal strategy in situations where opponents
make moves that are essentially simultaneous. Walker and Wooders [7] compared pre-
dictions from the theory of two-player simultaneous-move zero-sum games to observations
of service behavior in championship tennis matches. In that setting, the authors cannot
reject the hypothesis that servers win the same number of points when serving to the
opponent's forehand versus their backhand, as predicted by the theory. Additionally, they
nd that professionals seem to do better at choosing their behavior in a serially uncorre-
lated fashion, compared to behavior reported in laboratory games. This was good news
for the theory, as it has generally not done well in describing behavior of subjects in com-
parable laboratory games, and can be interpreted as indicating that motivated experts
may in fact conform more closely to the predictions of theory.
Chiappori et al [2], like Walker and Wooders, take mixed strategies as a starting
point in investigating behavior in penalty kicks in professional soccer. Unlike the repeated
interaction of tennis, a given striker and goaltender will face each other in a penalty kick
situation at most a few times in a season. Therefore, the authors focus on hypotheses
about aggregate behavior which are robust to the introduction of heterogeneity across
players. Mixed-strategy equilibrium theory predicts some empirical regularities that make
sense to the seasoned soccer observer: for example, that right-footed strikers should kick
towards their right more often than goalies will dive in that direction. The authors show
evidence that the theory of mixed-strategy equilibrium again organizes the data well.
This paper turns this theory to the analysis of the stolen base play in baseball. In par-
allel with the terminology used in baseball, the stolen base play is conceptualized as a
simple inspection game. In the game, the defense chooses between ``inspecting," which
gives the defense a positive probability to cause the stolen base play to fail, and not
inspecting, in which case the stolen base play, if attempted, is successful for the oense.
Heterogeneity in skill across players maps in the model to dierent levels of eectiveness
of the inspection ``technology." It is shown that linear relationship exists in equilibrium
between the probability the stolen base play is attempted and the probability the play is
successful.
The observed dataset for the stolen base play shares characteristics with that of the
penalty kick in soccer. While situations in the play of a game of baseball where a stolen
base can be attempted occur relatively frequently, the same individual players do not par-
2ticipate against each other in these ``stage games" repeatedly. This contrasts with the
repeated interaction of tennis players within a match which Walker and Wooders were
able to exploit. However, individual baseball players participate in these stage games
much more often than soccer players participate in penalty kicks over the course of a
season. This makes it feasible to investigate predictions of the theory relating to hetero-
geneity, which was not possible for Chiappori et al.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the stolen base play in baseball
and motivates the design of the model. A parsimonious idealization of the stolen base
game as an inspection game is developed in Section 3. In the model, the heterogeneous
abilities of players play the role of varying the ecacy of an inspection procedure. While
these abilities are not observable, the model does have comparative statics predictions
which can be expressed in terms of observable quantities. These predictions are taken to
detailed data from two decades of Major League Baseball games in Sections 4 and 5. Sec-
tion 6 concludes.
2 A primer on the stolen base play
In baseball, two competing teams take turns on oense and defense. While on oense,
each team attempts to score runs by advancing team members around a sequence of four
bases. The team's turn on oense is terminated when three of its members have
been ``put out," which can occur by various means; therefore, outs are a scarce resource
for a team. The game is won by the team scoring the most runs after nine innings (i.e.,
nine turns on oense for both teams); ties are broken by playing successive extra innings.
The players on a baseball team bat in a strict rotation (the ``batting order" ). As in
many bat-and-ball games (such as cricket or rounders), most advancement occurs on
batted balls, that is, when the current batter successfully strikes a pitched ball. However,
attempts to advance in baseball are permitted at any time. An attempt to advance a base
without the benet of the ball being batted is called an attempt to ``steal" a base. A
player successful in stealing a base has advanced one base closer to his ultimate goal of
scoring a run; a player who is unsuccessful is put out, costing the team one of its scarce
outs.
3A stolen base attempt can be thought of as a race. In this race, the oensive player
(the runner) runs a distance of about 90 feet. His opponents are members of the defense,
the pitcher and the catcher. The pitcher pitches the ball to the catcher, a distance of
about 60 feet, and then the catcher relays the ball to the base, a throw of an additional
120 feet. If the runner reaches the base prior to the relay throw from the catcher, the
attempt is succesful; if not, the attempt fails. While the runner need not wait until the
pitcher starts to pitch the ball to begin running, doing so would result in almost certain
failure, as the pitcher is permitted instead to throw directly to the base to which the
runner is advancing. Therefore, the runner wants to time his departure to closely match
the start of the pitcher's throw to the plate. The choices of the oense and defense are
made essentially in ignorance of each other, making a simultaneous-move model the nat-
ural choice for describing the interaction.
The interaction between a pitcher and a player known for stealing bases is often
described in language suggestive of mixed-strategy equilibrium. Pitchers are encouraged to
make the runner's ability to time his departure more dicult by varying the type, timing,
and style of their delivery of pitches; runners, for their part, try to avoid patterns in their
behavior, such as always attempting to steal at the rst opportunity. Professionals thus
perceive some advantage to unpredictability in this setting, which suggests that an equi-
librium in mixed strategies should be a feature of an appropriate organizing theory.
Finally, the wide availability of data in modern professional sport ensures that common
knowledge of the abilities of the relevant players obtains; therefore, it is reasonable to
model this interaction as one of perfect information regarding the revelant parameters.
3 The stolen base play as an inspection game
A particular state of a baseball game can be described by a state vector containing, for
example, the inning, score, number of outs, and other relevant factors. Suppose, as in the
previous section, that the oense has a runner on rst base. At such a point in the pro-
gress of the game, the future continuations of the game can be summarized by a vector v,
which expresses the probability the team currently on oense will eventually win the
game, conditional on the outcome of the interaction to be described next.
To focus on the stolen base play, the interaction is modeled as a simultaneous-move
game. In this game, the oense chooses whether to attempt the stolen base play (strategy
S) or not (strategy N). Meanwhile, the defense chooses whether to focus their eorts on
4trying to put out the batter currently at the plate (strategy B) or trying to interdict a
possible stolen base attempt by focusing on the runner (strategy R). If the stolen base
play is attempted, there are two possible outcomes: success, resulting in the runner
reaching the next base safely, and failure, resulting in the runner being put out.
batter (B) runner (R)
attempt (S) vS vS + (1   )vF
no attempt (N) vB vR
Table 1. A model of the stolen base play as a zero-sum game between the oense and the defense. In the
table, the oense is the row chooser, and the defense the column chooser. The cell entries are the payos
to the oense, measured as the probability the game will eventually be won by the team on oense.
The structure of this game is presented in Table 1. It is assumed that both teams seek
to maximize the probability of eventually winning the game. Each entry in the table is the
probability the team on oense will eventually win the game, conditional on the corre-
sponding strategy prole being chosen. The payo to the defense is one minus that of the
oense.
The vector v of continuation values has four components. The continuation value after
a successful attempt is vS, and vF is the continuation value after a failed attempt. The
continuation values vB and vR describe the continuations where the play is not attempted.
The defense's strategy R is their ``inspection" strategy. When playing this strategy,
only a fraction  of stolen base attempts are successful. An attempt is always successful
when the defense does not inspect and plays strategy B.
Four inequalities are assumed to hold, which jointly ensure the equilibrium is unique
and involves active randomization by both sides.
 vS > vS + (1   )vF: This will hold if  < 1 and vS > vF. This states that a team on
oense prefers success to failure, which must be true since no team has a strategic
incentive to have the runner deliberately put out in this setting.
 vS > vB. This says that a succesful attempt is better than just letting the batter hit
the ball. This will hold since after a successful attempt, the batter's turn continues,
while the runner has advanced towards scoring a run.
 vR > vB. This encodes an assumption that inspection is costly in the event that an
attempt does not occur. This cost derives from the idea that the defense must
modify their pitching approach to the batter, and is motivated by the following
5logic. If there were no runner on base, the pitcher and batter can be thought of as
engaging in their own zero-sum game (not explicitly modeled here), with the
pitcher choosing the type and location of pitch to throw, and the batter forming
expectations about the pitch. Now, with the baserunner on rst base, let the
strategy B in the game corresponds to following the optimal strategy against the
batter as if there were no runner on, and R corresponds to following some modied
pitching strategy to defend against the runner. In the latter case, it must be that
the defense is no longer using their minimax strategy against the batter, and so the
batter will perform better. That this eect is important in analyzing this interac-
tion is pointed out by Smith [5]:
[A]ny consideration of base running must include indirect and often
subtle eects.... The greatest of these indirect eects is of course the
intangible of upsetting the pitcher by diverting his attention from the
batter.





This condition says that the runner is not so skilled (or the defensive players so
unskilled) that it is always a best reply to attempt.
The ratio appearing in equation (1) is related to the ``breakeven" percentages which
appear in the analyses Lindsey [3] and Bellman [1]. Those papers view the stolen base
as a decision problem, with only the oense making a choice (whether to attempt or not
to attempt). Those models only predict that the frequency with which the stolen base
play is successful will exceed the critical breakeven percentage, but are silent on the ques-
tion of optimal attempt frequencies; the mixed strategy equilibrium of this game model
will provide sharper predictions.
When the equilibrium is in mixed strategies, the equations for the equilibrium proba-
bilities of attempting the stolen base play, pS






(1   )(vS   vF) + (vR   vB)
(2)
pB
? ( ) =
vR   [vS + (1   )vF]
(1   )(vS   vF) + (vR   vB)
(3)
6Note that pS
?( ) is increasing in  and that pB
? ( ) is decreasing in : runners who are
better at the stolen base play attempt it more frequently, and the defense ``inspects" more
often as the ability of the runner increases.
In the model, it is assumed that an attempt is always successful when the defense
plays strategy B, that is, when the defense does not ``inspect." While this is a simplica-
tion, it is a plausible approximation. In order to play reach the highest level of the sport,
a player cannot be too slow afoot. Furthermore, Section 4 takes this model to a dataset
consisting of players for whom stolen base attempts are a salient activity, and among this
subset of players it is certain that most, if not all of them, would win the relay race
described in Section 2 with a very high frequency if they did not have to worry about the
possibility of the R strategy being played.
Anecdotally, what separates the runners successful at stealing bases from those who
are not known for stealing bases is their performance when being watched closely by the
defense. For example, Oakland Athletics coach Ron Washington has been quoted as
saying:
``A base stealer is a guy who when everyone in the ... yard know he gonna
get the bag, he gets the bag." 1
Interpreted probabilistically, this is a feature of this model. Suppose the defense is
expecting the stolen base play to be attempted and therefore plays the inspection strategy
R. A talented base stealer will be successful with relatively high probability (i.e.,  is
large when compared to other players).
4 An observable relationship
Since the parameter  is not observable, it is desireable to seek relationships between
observable quantities. Let ?( )  pB
? ( ) + [1   pB
? ( )] denote the percentage of stolen
base attempts which are successful in equilibrium.
Proposition 1. There is an ane relationship between the frequency of attempts pS
?( )
and the frequency ofsuccess ?( ) in equilibrium as a function of.
1. Quoted in Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game , by Michael Lewis, W. W. Norton & Company,
2003, page 265.
7Proof. It is asserted that there are constants A and B satisfying
?( ) = ApS
?( ) + B:
In view of (3), this can be written
(vR   vF)   (vB   vF) = A(vR   vB) + B[(1   )(vS   vF) + (vR   vB)]:
Collecting coecients of :






vR   vF = A(vR   vB) + B(vS   vF) + B(vR   vB)
= A(vR   vB) + (vB   vF) + B(vR   vB)
vR   vB = A(vR   vB) + B(vR   vB)
1   B = A:
Therefore, pS













Since the vector v of continuation values depends on the state of the game, the value
of the ratio (vB   vF)/(vS   vF) also depends on the state of the game. Therefore, the
analysis specializes to the case where the stolen base game arises at the beginning of the
baseball game. In particular, attention is restricted to situations in which a team's rst
hitter reaches rst base in his team's rst turn at bat of the game with a tie score. It is
commonplace for Major League Baseball teams to place a player who is considered a
thread to attempt the stolen base play in this rst place in their batting order; therefore,
the stolen base play is a salient part of game at these points in time, and the conditions
for mixed-strategy equilibrium are most likely to obtain.
In this early phase of the game, the tournament eects arising from only needing to
score more runs than one's opponent to win (i.e., that winning by one run is as good as
winning by ten) are minimized, and in such a case maximizing the expected number of
8runs scored in the inning is a good approximation to a team's true objective of maxi-
mizing the chances of winning the game. Palmer and Thorn [6] present a table of the
expected number of future runs in an inning as a function of the current number of outs
and location of runners. The expected number of runs with a runner on rst base and no
outs is 0.783 (  vB). The expected number of runs with a runner on second base and no
outs (i.e., the situation after a successful attempt to steal) is 1.068; the expected number








The theory thus predicts a relationship of approxmiately ?= 0.652 + 0.348pS
?.
To test this prediction, play-by-play data from all Major League Baseball games
played in the 1974 through 1992 seasons, inclusive, were examined to identify all situa-
tions in which the rst hitter on a team reached rst base in his team's rst turn at bat. 2
For each player in each season, the number of times he reached rst base in this situation,
the number of times he attempted to steal, and the number of times he was successful
were tabulated.
Three specications of the relationship between the frequency of attempting to steal
pS and success percentage  are investigated:  = 0;  = 0 + 1pS; and  = 0 + 1pS +
2pS
2. In practice, both pS and  in this model are observed with randomness, as the deci-
sion whether to attempt a steal is being modeled as the product of an equilibrium in
mixed strategies, and the realization of  depends on the realizations of the defense's
mixed strategy. For the purposes of the estimation, the values of pS are treated as being
observed without error, while the observations of  are treated as being observed with
noise. Since the noise in the observation of  decreases as the (square root of the) number
of attempts made, and the noise in the obseration of pS decreases as the (square root of
the) number of opportunities, the noise in the observation of  is more salient. Further-
more, since the number of attempts made by dierent players is dierent, there is het-
eroskedasticity in the observations of  across dierent player-seasons. To accommodate
this, a maximum likelihood approach is used.
2. These data are available on the website of Retrosheet, http: //www. retrosheet. org. The term ``play-by-
play" means that the dataset identies all events that change the number of outs, or the conguration of baserun-
ners; that is to say, all batter outcomes, as well as the timing and outcome of stolen base plays.
9A cuto of a minimum of 20 observations for a player-season was used, resulting in 326
player-seasons; adjusting this cuto does not substantively change the results. A scatter-
plot of the data is shown in Figure 1. The rst row in Table 2 presents the estimated
relationships between  and pS for the three specications. Negative log-likelihoods are
given in parentheses. The results indicate that the ane model signicantly outperforms
the constant specication, and the quadratic model is not signicantly better than the
ane model. The coecients in the ane model are close to those predicted by the
theory.
Many runners appear in this sample appear multiple times in dierent seasons during
their career. As such, panel data concerns may arise. To address this, the same three
specications were estimated using career-level data for players. Again, a cuto of a min-
imum of 20 observations for a player over his career was used, resulting in 299 players. 3
The scatterplot of this data appears in Figure 2. The second row of Table 2 presents the
estimates for the models on this data. No qualitative dierences in coecient estimates
are observed in comparing the player-season to player-career data, and, again, the ane
model signicantly outperforms the constant model, and the quadratic model can be
rejected in favor of the ane model. The coecient estimates for the ane model again
track the theoretical prediction closely.
The parameter  is aected not only by the talents of a runner, but also by character-
istics of a pitcher. Therefore, viewed from the defensive perspective, the same relationship
should hold across the population of pitchers. There is an asymmetry in how pitchers are
used in a baseball season compared to other regular players: while a regular player will
appear in almost all of his team's games, pitchers are used in a rotation, pitching every
fourth or fth game on average. Therefore, the number of observations in the dataset for a
given season for a pitcher is small, making individual season analysis impractical. 4 Aggre-
gating over pitchers' careers, however, a similar pattern emerges to the results for runners.
Again using a minimum of 20 observations, the scatterplot for the 309 pitchers appears as
Figure 3. The third row of Table 2 presents the three models estimated using pitchers'
career data. Again the coecients are qualitatively similar to those of both estimations
using runners' data, as well as the predictions of the theory.
3. This number is less than that for the number of player-seasons because many players appear multiple times
in the season-by-season sample.
4. Very few pitchers even participate in 10 game situations that meet the requirements in a season.
10N constant predicted specication quadratic




:64 + :35pS   :06pS
2
(493.54)




:62 + :37pS   :03pS
2
(419.19)




:66 + :24pS + :09pS
2
(542.63)
Table 2. Estimated relationships between pS and . Numbers in parentheses are negative log-likelihoods.
5 Evidence of the defense's strategy
An increase in the baserunner's stealing skills results in increased attention paid to the
runner by the defense. Recall that the inequality vR > vB is motivated by an assumption
that batters perform better when the defense chooses to focus on the runner (to play
strategy R) relative to when the defense chooses to focus on the batter (to play strategy
B). Since an increase in  causes the defense to increase its equilibrium probability of
choosing R, the observed performance of the batter should improve.
This indicates that batters' performance should improve more with a runner on rst
base who has a higher . Similar to the choice of the receiving player in Walker and
Wooders, the defensive choice of B or R is not directly observed. Because of the presence
of the theorized eect on batter performance, this prediction provides a way of indirectly
observing the eect on the defense's choices.
This prediction is tested by considering pairs of two players from the same team. In
each pair, the performance of one player while batting with the other player occupying
rst base is tabulated. Additionally, the performance of the batting player is also tabu-
lated for situations in which he batted with no runner on base. There were 722 such
batter-runner pairs in the dataset in which the runner was on rst base at least 50 times
when the batter came to bat.
To operationalize what it means for a batter to perform better, the sum of a player's
on-base percentage and slugging percentage is used to index performance. This sum,
abbreviated OPS in baseball, correlates highly with run-scoring at a team level. 5 Figure 4
11contains a scatterplot of the data, with the frequency of stolen base attempts pS on the
horizontal axis, and the increase in the batter's performance OPS on the vertical axis.
OPS OPS
Group N Median Mean OPS > 0
pS = 0.0 42 -0.004 0.006 20 (47.6%)
pS 2 (0.0; 0.2] 595 0.042 0.051 368 (61.8%)
pS > 0.2 85 0.134 0.109 59 (69.4%)
Table 3. The change in batter performance, measured by OPS, with a runner on rst base compared to
with the bases empty. The four groups are delineated by the frequency with which the runner on rst
base attempted to steal during the season. N is the number of batter-runner pairs in each group.
A regression of OPS on pS gives the line (standard errors in parentheses)
OPS = 0.032 + 0.249 pS
(0.010) (0.081)
with a standard error of 0.187 and an adjusted R2 of 0.011. Both coecients are signi-
cantly dierent from zero at the .01 level. The positive slope agrees with the prediction of
the model that batters hitting with a runner with higher  enjoy better batting perfor-
mance. In this data, the relatively large standard error, visible also in the scatterplot,
arises because even a sample of 50 times batting is not very large for evaluating an indi-
vidual batter's performance.
Another way of looking at the data is to group the batter-runner pairs according to
the frequency with which the runner attempted the stolen base play overall. Table 3 pre-
sents the data aggregated into three groups: a group in which the runner never was
observed to attempt the stolen base play ( pS = 0); a group where the runner attempted
with a positive frequency, but no more than twenty percent ( pS 2 (0.0; 0.2]); and a group
where the runner attempted more than twenty percent of the time ( pS > 0.2). Among
these groups, the median and mean OPS increases as the frequency with which the
runner attempted the stolen base play increases. The percentage of the pairs in which the
batter's realized performance was better with the runner on rst base than without
increases as pS increases. The test of equality of the proportions of increases between the
pS = 0 and pS 2 (0; 0.2] groups gives a p-value of .165; the test of equality of the propor-
tions of increases between the pS 2 (0; 0.2] and pS > 0.2 groups gives a p-value of 0.066.
5. For the 1974 through 1992 seasons, the correlation between a team's OPS in a season and its runs scored
per game was 0.935.
12Finally, note the group where pS = 0. It can be said that, for these runners, the stolen
base play was not a salient activity, and for them, the mixed-strategy theory presented
here is not appropriate. 6 In that case, there is no signicant observed dierence, on
average, between the performance of the batters with and without those runners on base.
6 Conclusions
The theory of mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in a stylized inspection game organizes the
observations of baseball teams' conduct in the stolen base play in Major League Baseball.
Complementing the earlier papers of Walker and Wooders in tennis and Chiappori et al in
soccer, the results indicate that this theory is a useful descriptive tool when experienced,
motivated players interact in an environment where asymmetric information is not a sig-
nicant factor.
The structure of the dataset allows investigation of the eects of individual hetero-
geneity in a way that was not available to Chiappori et al in the data on soccer penalty
kicks. However, the data is not sucient to test, as in Walker and Wooders, whether
behavior is serially uncorrelated. As a descriptive theory, though, it is perhaps less impor-
tant whether objective randomization is truly occuring, as interpreting the theory in terms
of beliefs about the other side's behavior may be sucient.
A key advantage to the tennis, soccer, and baseball datasets is that in modern profes-
sional sports, informational asymmetries can certainly be said to be small. The modern
athlete (and team, in team sports) has the means to closely study the skills and behavior
of opponents, thereby making the underlying assumption of common knowledge of the
game compelling. An emerging feature of the baseball dataset, however, is that it is cur-
rently being researched back over the more than a century of continuous existence of pro-
fessional baseball in the United States. This extends back before the days of television,
radio, and heavy scouting, to a time when it was not uncommon for a team to come to
town with some completely unknown players. A preliminary analysis of partial data from
this era indicates that the model presented here fails to describe the data in this setting
where common knowledge almost certainly fails.
6. In particular, for them, it is likely the assumption that the play is always successful when the defense
chooses B is violated, and therefore the strategy S may be dominated.
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Frequency of stolen base attempt
Figure 1. Scatterplot of frequency of attempt of stolen base play versus percentage of attempts suc-
cessful. Each point represents one runner in one season, with a minimum requirement of having 20 oppor-









































Frequency of stolen base attempt
Figure 2. Scatterplot of frequency of attempt of stolen base play versus percentage of attempts suc-
cessful. Each point represents one runner over his career, with a minimum requirement of having 20









































Frequency of stolen base attempt
Figure 3. Scatterplot of frequency of attempt of stolen base play versus percentage of attempts suc-
cessful. Each point represents one pitcher over his career, with a minimum requirement of having 20
































Frequency of stolen base attempt
Figure 4. Scatterplot of frequency with which runner attempts to steal against the change in batter's
performance with that runner on rst (relative to batter's performance with no runner).
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